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When an electronic identity management (eIDM) system users seek to communicate with governments 
using a different eIDM system, both systems should be linked and should understand each other. To 
achieve this, the European Union is workingon an interoperability framework. 
F or approximately 10 years, European member nations and economic-area nations have been 
implementing electronic identity management (eIDM) 
systems based on their national requirements. Owing to 
the diversity of eIDM systems, when users of one gov-
ernments system seek to communicate with govern-
ments using a different system, generally both systems 
should be linked and should understand each other. 
That is, a user s identity in one system should be under-
stood and accepted by other systems. 
For example, imagine that a Spanish citizen holding 
a Spanish identity card moves to Germany to take a job. 
He rents out his fíat in Spain. While he's working in Ger-
many his company secures him a contract to work in 
France for six months. At the end of the year, this citizen 
must pay taxes in Germany France, and Spain, and he 
should be able to do so with a single identity card. 
However, technical, social, and legal problems arise 
from the use of these systems and their interoperabil-
ity. For that Spanish citizen, technical problems would 
occur regarding the digital identifier to use because 
these three countries' certification policies are incom-
patible. Moreover, there's no common European law 
on the type of personal data a digital identity should 
include. Societal acceptance of an identification system 
is far from equal in all EU member nations, and the 
legislation and standards aren't uniform. This prompts 
significant doubts among citizens as to such a systems 
convenience. This is especially relevant when consider-
ing privacy and data protection, where citizens might 
feel a loss of control over their privacy. 
The interoperability of eIDM systems at a pan-
European level is a burning issue that has led to several 
research projects.1'2 Basically, these projects have culmi-
nated in the proposal for a security infrastructure based 
on a federated model, as we describe in this article. 
Criteria for PaivEuropean eIDM Systems 
To successfully establish the interoperability frame-
work, the EU has drawn up a road map with a series of 
design principies based on the fundamental principie of 
subsídíaríty? That is, each member nation must main-
tain its autonomy and responsibility to continué its 
eIDM initiatives. These principies give rise to four cri-
teria for apan-European eIDM system: 
• It must be federated; that is, mutual trust must exist 
between the different governments regarding the 
identification and authentication methods. 
• It must allow member nations to provide múltiple 
levéis of security. The requirements for each mem-
ber nation's authentication of eIDM systems must be 
adaptable to its security needs. 
• To guarantee the quality of information, each mem-
ber nation must have one reliable source for each 
piece of information corresponding to a registered 
entity to avoid data duplication and ensure a single 
correct, official source. 
• In member nations in which private companies are 
trusted, the eIDM system should allow the private 
sector (for example, financial institutions) to pro-
vide eIDM. 
In accordance with the Modinis IDM consortium's 
study1 we define federated identity as the common 
approaches for achieving interoperabüity between eIDM 
systems that opérate in sepárate (although often similar) 
contexts.4 Generally this can mean one of two things: 
eifher a person's user information stored across múltiple 
eIDM systems is virtually reunited, or a user can authen-
ticate across múltiple IT systems or even organizations. 
We can therefore deduce that federated identity 
refers to a shared effort to achieve the interoperabüity of 
eIDM systems from different environments. In this way 
information on a user's identity possibly spread across 
different regions, can be gathered so that the user can be 
identified in one environment and consequently have 
access to others. The various service providers (SPs) 
can also access the user's information in the different 
environments. 
A Federated eIDM System 
Generally three entities or agents particípate in a feder-
ated identity scenario: 
• The user seeks to access a providers services. This 
user's identity is federated. We assume that some form 
of credential is recognizable by the identity provider 
(IdP) and possibly the SP. 
• The SP offers a service to the user after authentication. 
If the SP recognizes the user's original credentials, it 
can perform direct authentication. If not, it delegates 
authentication to the IdP 
• The IdP validates the user's credentials and deliv-
ers session credentials (such as a Security Assertion 
Markup Language [SAML] assertion, an X.509 cer-
tifícate of a very short duration, and the signature of 
a piece of information) that the SP can validate when 
authenticating the user before providing a service. 
Taking into account the participating entities and 
exchanges (see Figure 1), we could say that a federated 
eIDM system is a sequence of entities that transforms 
a user credential (that, in theory SPs don't need to 
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Figure 1. Interactions in an abstract federated eiectronic identity management 
(eIDM) system model. Although this example shows a federated eIDM system in 
which the service provider (SP) initiates federation, in some systems, the identity 
provider (IdP) initiates federation. 
understand) into a session credential. This session cre-
dential is something that SPs can fully understand and 
wül serve as the basis for deciding whether to provide 
the requested service. 
Federated identity extends the eID's use as an internal 
aspect of one SP into something common to múltiple SPs. 
This change can evoke complicated management pro-
cesses related to how the identity is registered, revoked, 
and modified in an IdP This exposes federated identities 
to new security risks that must be counteracted.5 
In an e-government eIDM system, the use of feder-
ated identity usually means that two administrations 
decide to mutually trust each other's identification and 
authentication methods. So, although federated iden-
tity depends on establishing trust and involves greater 
security risks, it constitutes a key factor in achiev-
ing interoperabüity between the different countries' 
eIDM systems. 
Current Pan-European eIDM Systems 
Since the publication of the EU's e-government action 
plan in 20066 and as a result of subsequent directives 
for all member nations, several initiatives now focus on 
pan-European interoperabüity among eIDM systems. 
Here, we look at the most significant proposals for such 
systems. These proposals have influenced development 
toward the present pan-European model, whose viabü-
ity is being tested in the Storkproject. 
The Modinis IDM Study 
One of the first projects dedicated to eIDM sys-
tem interoperabüity was the Modinis IDM study1 It 
defined key enablers that all European nations should 
adopt to provide 
• rapid e-government services in a mobile, ubiquitous 
environment, 
• authentic data repositories (capable of guaranteeing 
that information is accurate and authentic for a cer-
tain entity), and 
• compatible methods and authentication levéis. 
The study defined an infrastructure based on a fed-
erated model that relies on (at least one) IdP in each 
member nation to authenticate an entity at a national 
level and decide the level of trust to grant to different 
authentication processes in each nation. In this model, 
the authentication requirements for a specific service 
in a nation would honor the authentication levéis and 
mechanisms used in another nation as equivalents on 
the basis of a set of previously defined criteria. This 
would make an EU-specific infrastructure unnecessary 
TLS-Federation 
The TLS-Federation2 (where TLS stands for Transport 
Layer Security) model uses the public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) during authentication. It employs a user-
centered approach; users directly manage identity and 
privacy attributes. 
TLS-Federation is a proposal for system federation 
based on sufficiently known and tested standards— 
specifically the TLS protocol and X.509 certificates. 
So, TLS-Federation applies the TLS protocol in its cli-
ent authentication mode based on an X.509 certifícate 
to a federated identity environment. The fundamental 
idea is that IdPs will deliver X.509 certificates as secu-
rity assertions to SPs via the TLS handshake protocol. 
The X.509 assertions act as session credentials with a 
limited life span and take the place of any other type of 
security token, such as SAML assertions. 
If we compare TLS-Federation with other pro-
posed eIDM systems, the solution proves viable, par-
ticularly in creating a cost-efncient infrastructure. It's 
the only solution that requires few (if any) additional 
installations and doesn't require converting session 
credentials for a member nations domain to access the 
pan-European domain. 
Nevertheless, TLS-Federation has its drawbacks. 
For example, it can work only with X.509 certifícate 
eIDs, and not all countries are ready to implement 
these. It would require a detailed study of the possible 
use of TLS extensions that can map non-X.509 cer-
tifícate user credentials into X.509 session certificates. 
However, although the exclusive management of cre-
dentials based on X.509 certificates is a current chal-
lenge, it shouldn't be in the long run because the trend 
in EU member nations is toward using such credentials 
to robustly identify citizens and entities. 
If EU member nations implement a strong authen-
tication system and employ government IdPs based on 
PKI, then TLS-Federation might be an option for pan-
European authentication. However, this solution doesn't 
enable eIDM system integration for countries whose 
current systems aren t based on certificates. So, although 
it s a good solution, it isn't presently applicable in the EU. 
Regardless, studying the authentication-related fea-
tures in TLS-Federation is worthwhile because they 
require little integration work. Every part of the tech-
nology is available and is supported by most operating 
systems, search engines, and webservers—its simply a 
matter of activating the system. 
Guide 
The Guide project (http://istrg.som.surrey.ac.uk/  
projects/guide/overview.html) proposed a model for 
European ID interoperability based on the concept of 
a federated eIDM system network in which members, 
users, administrators, and enterprises can exchange 
identity information without compromising their pri-
vacy and security. This model requires the prior affilia-
tion of members in circles of trust—that is, federations 
of SPs and IdPs that have established formal relations 
and operational agreements and whose service consum-
ere can carry out transactions. 
There are now both technical solutions that enable 
this type of federation and examples of good practices. 
InCommon (www.incommon.org) is a common-trust 
framework that includes trustworthy shared manage-
ment of access to online resources in support of educa-
tion and research in the US. EduGain (www.edugain. 
org) enables global collaboration in research by linking 
30 European academic networks and organizations to 
each other, as well as to other regio ns of the world. 
In the EU, a number of these federations and circles 
of trust have been established for different administra-
tive and commercial stakeholders. Particularly, many 
member nations are involved in developing such federa-
tions at a national level. However, many of these federa-
tions have been or are being established in isolation from 
one another. This doesn't comply with Guide principies, 
which cali for a pan-European federation of identities. 
Stork 
Incorporating ideas from the Guide project, the Stork 
project (Secure Identity across Borders Linfced; www. 
eid-stork.eu) proposed a pan-European eIDM system. 
This project (ended in December 2011 but currently 
extended as Stork 2.0) developed and tested common 
specifications for mutual, secure national eIDs of par-
ticipating countries. The EU is adopting its results as a 
model for guidelines for member nations to follow to 
achieve a pan-European eIDM system. 
Stork's proposed model is based on preliminary 
studies by IDABC (Interoperable Delivery of Euro-
pean eGovernment Services to Public Administra-
do ns, Business, and Citizens)7 that describe a federated 
model for interoperability that's technologically neu-
tral and supports múltiple levéis of authentication. It 
relies on a proxy and requires creating national IdPs 
(at least one per country). Stork combines this system 
of IdPs with a network of gateways or proxy SPs called 
PEPS (pan-European proxy services). Figure 2 illus-
trates the model. 
PEPS would be created at a national level (although 
the model allows for one at a centralized EU level or 
even a mixed model) in which some countries would 
rely on national PEPS, whereas others would use Euro-
pean PEPS. PEPS would be useful mainly in overcom-
ing technical problems that arise when a broad range 
of identification and authorization solutions exists for 
access to services, as is the case in the EU. For example, 
one citizen might want to use a login to access a service, 
whereas another wishes to use an eID card. Assuming 
that the application's owner accepts both identification 
methods, the technical infrastructure must be able to 
support both solutions. So, the Stork model defines four 
quality authentication assurance (QAA) levéis.8 The 
lowest level would correspond to eID solutions based 
on users and passwords; the highest level would occur 
through an X.509 certifícate with an eID or smart card. 
The four QAA levéis takes into account each solu-
tions organizational and technical components. On the 
basis of these levéis, national identity solutions can be 
mapped onto previously defined and agreed-upon par-
teras. This will allow the Stork model to be applied in 
all countries, regardless of which identification systems 
they allow. So, if different QAAlevels are allowed access 
to a service, the technical infrastructure should be able 
to support them. 
This is where PEPS come into play They mainly con-
nect SPs with the proper IdPs in each country, redirect-
ing authentication requests to the pertinent IdP, and 
validate the trust and security of the identity informa-
tion that the IdPs sent. So, all the PEPS form a circle of 
trust in accordance with the solutions specified by the 
Liberty Alliance (www.projectliberty.org). Regarding 
technologies, Stork suggests using SAML assertions to 
transport identity attributes from IdPs to SPs via PEPS. 
The project seeks to rely on, as far as possible, open stan-
dards. It provides a solution to interoperability at a pan-
European level that doesn't require modifications to 
national eIDM systems, thus taking into account the use 
of all identification and authorization models deployed 
in EU member countries. 
Figure 2. Stork's proposed model. Stork combines a system of IdPs with a 
network of gateways or proxy SPs called PEPS (pan-European proxy services). 
Remaining Challenges 
Because the EU's adopted solution implements a fed-
erated infrastructure, it can sepárate service provisión 
from the digital-identity-related processes necessary 
to provide the service (namely, user registration, gen-
eration and storage of identification data, and authen-
tication). Because the system is multilevel, it can 
(theoretically, with no major changes) incorpórate all 
countries with their own eIDs and eIDM systems, thus 
accelerating the implementation of a pan-European 
eIDM system. However, there are still barriers to over-
eóme if this solution is to be feasible. 
Creating a Federated System 
An analysis of the state of affairs regarding the legislation 
and implementation of eIDM systems in Europe shows 
distinctions across member nations. Some have clearly 
implemented eIDs and eIDM systems, whereas others 
are only beginning the process. A single, global focus on 
eIDM system implementation is therefore inadequate 
because not all countries are beginning from the same 
point, and every country handles data and deals with 
citizens differently 
Fortunately, the EU's solution requires no deploy-
ment or minimal deployment of an EU-level infra-
structure. Aso, countries that are less technologically 
advanced or that have fewer resources can easily and 
quickly be incorporated in the European federated sys-
tem. Reaching total integration will require the ability 
to incorpórate less advanced countries in a way that's 
simple and not onerous—economically or technologi-
cally—by means of central PEPS. 
A federated system should be able to créate a circle of 
trust among the infrastructures of all member countries 
and enable the easy inclusión of future countries. Such 
a system will allow creation of a pan-European infra-
structure with hardly any changes to current systems. 
Toward that end, possible solutions could use identity 
portáis in each country to handle internal authenti-
cation and to manage trust placed in other countries' 
eIDM systems. Or, they could rely on service access 
proxies in each country. These solutions would adapt 
perfectly to federation and the idea of maintaining the 
systems already implemented in the member nations as 
much as possible. 
Providing Transparency 
Because of existing systems' heterogeneity and different 
countries' authentication and authorization mechanisms, 
a pan-European system must be able to map identity 
tokens delivered by the one country s eIDM system to 
their counterparts in another country. This will help 
make access to services as transparent as possible to users. 
Avoiding Redundancy 
The interoperability solution proposed by Stork still 
faces many stumbling blocks. The first involves man-
aging information, specifically concerning the reliabil-
ity and quality of the data handled. Typically existing 
eIDM systems have no single data source, which could 
give rise to duplication problems and lack of coher-
ence. As we mentioned earlier, every country must have 
a single reliable source for every piece of information 
pertaining to a registered entity thus preventing dupli-
cation and guaranteeing accurate and official data. This 
is a concern because many European countries have sev-
eral administration levéis (local, regional, and national) 
that often rely on data that isn't synchronized, thus lead-
ing to redundancies and inconsistencies. 
Integrating the Prívate Sector 
Except for Stork 2.0, none of the projects we discussed 
considered employing the private sector to provide the 
eIDM system infrastructure or to be SPs. This is the 
case even though the EU road map specifies that the 
development of private-sector applications that rely on 
public eIDM system infrastructures should receive spe-
cial attention.3 
The technical challenges of integrating the private 
sector often involve the discouraging task of integrating 
proprietary and nonstandard systems with federated 
authorization systems. Moreover, the social challenges 
seem insurmountable, as evidenced by the insufncient 
integration between private entities and governments 
in the same country. Presumably, a certain degree of 
trust in these environments should exist because data 
custody and information protection are regulated and 
legislated under the same criteria. Nevertheless, if full 
interoperability hasn't been achieved in abounded envi-
ronment such as public administration, it seems highly 
unlikely that cross-borderidentification and authentica-
tion solutions such as those proposed in this article will 
be adopted in the short term for service provisión in the 
private sector. 
Even more questions arise when the private sector 
refers to small- and medium-sized private enterprises, 
which have fewer resources and less specialized per-
sonnel. Present proposals barely address possibilities 
for integration with industry and offer solutions solely 
for interoperability in the public sector. How can such 
solutions intégrate with the identity environments most 
commonly used in industry? From our perspective, 
this issue has received little attention, and little identi-
fication integration exists between the public and pri-
vate sectors. In any given country, few service provisión 
environments use that country s available public eIDM 
systems. (A remarkable and isolated example of using 
public X.509 certificates in the private sector comes 
from some electronic bank services, which accept these 
certificates to verify users' identities.) 
The Stork 2.0 project aims to tackle these problems 
and genérate solutions that are viable in the EU. Its goal 
is to achieve the convergence of the private and public 
sectors in an operational framework and infrastructure 
encompassing eID for secure electronic authentication 
of citizens. 
Accommodating Electronic Signatures 
Another problem is the interoperability of electronic sig-
natures. European legislation lets anyone use his or her 
eID to sign any piece of information going to a recipient, 
who could be in a different EU country. This means that 
the entity receiving a signed document must be able to 
verify the signature, irrespective of the signing entity's eID. 
Although the technical validation of signatures has 
its challenges regarding scaling, the real problem for 
the receiving party is the risk implied by accepting the 
signature. This risk is determined by the legal situation, 
the cryptography's quality, the liability situation, and 
the certification authority's trustworthiness. To solve 
these problems, initiatives are developing guidelines, 
specifications, and pilot solutions to overeóme the lack 
of interoperability between national schemes for elec-
tro nically signed tender documents. It's to be hoped that 
these problems will disappear and that signature verifica-
tion can be carried out in the future with full guarantees. 
E uropean countries have made significant efforts to achieve interoperability among the differ-
ent national eIDM systems. Although we believe that 
pan-European eIDM systems are technologically viable, 
we recognize that interoperability in identity manage-
ment isn't just a technological problem. Significant legal 
barriers affect cross-border and cross-sector relations, 
and the EU should provide the appropriate legal sup-
port before achieving the desired interoperability. 
Regarding the possible alignment of present Solu-
tions with future technology trends, these solutions' 
viability depends on the path that public administra-
tions take regarding service provisión. Present trends 
appear to point toward providing services in the cloud. 
In the médium term, this will probably involve each gov-
ernment creating its own isolated cloud. Here, the Stork 
project might become viable with minimal modifica-
do ns. As we've seen, present eIDM systems and service 
provisión environments constitute independent islands 
managed by a certain public administration or country 
Stork proposes an interoperability solution for these 
islands. At first glance, the fact that the islands become 
clouds wouldn t appear to pose greater problems for this 
solution, which would interconnect and ensure interop-
erability between clouds through proxies. 
We believe the EU is moving in the right direction. 
Single virtual-identity domains, such as the one in 
Stork, could be useful for global environments or ser-
vices requiring authentication mechanisms that enable 
smart, automatic user registration and ensure smooth 
identity transition across SPs. 
Global online identification will pose new chal-
lenges and solutions. A pan-European interoperability 
infrastructure will be a first step toward more complex 
identity systems that allow secure management of new 
user-identification attributes. Further research must 
proceed in the semantic interoperability of attributes, 
with the aim of achieving comprehension across differ-
ent eIDM systems. To the extent that these objectives 
are met, citizens will be able to use online services with 
greater assurances of security than are currently avail-
able and, therefore, with more satisfaction. • 
Acknowledgments 
This article is part of research we're conducting in the Tali-
sec+ project (a framework for knowledge-based management 
of accessible security guarantees for personal autonomy; 
TIN2010-20510-C04-0l),supportedbytheMinistryofEdu-
cation and Science of Spain through the National Plan for 
R+D+I (research, development, and innovation). 
References 
1. Modinis Study on Identity Management in eGovernment, 
tech. report, European Commission, 2006; http:/ /  
ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/  
documents/eidm_conceptua l_framework.pdf. 
2. P. Bruegger, D. Hühnlein, and J. Schwenk, "TLS-
Federation—a Secure and Relying-Party-Friendly Ap-
proach for Federated Identity Management," Proc. Special 
Interest Group on Biometrics and Electronic Signatures (BIO-
SIG 08), Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2008, pp. 93-106. 
3. A Roadmapfor a Pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, 
ver. 1.0, European Commission Information Soc. and 
Media Directorate-General, 2007; http://ec.europa.eu/  
informationsociety/activities/egovernment/docs/pdf/ 
eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf. 
4. "Federated Identity," Modinis-IDM consortium, 2005; 
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/  
twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/Federatedldentity 
5. C. Steel, R. Nagappan, and R. Lai, Core Security Patterns: 
Best Practices and Strategies for J2EE, Web Services, and 
Identity Management, Prentice Hall, 2005. 
6. Í2010 eGovernment Action Plan: Accelerating eGovern-
ment in Europefor the Benefit ofAll, Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006; http://eur-lex.europa. 
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0173: 
FIN:EN:PDF 
7. J. Majava and H. Graux, eID Interoperability for PEGS: 
Common Specifications for eID Interoperability in the 
eGovernment Context, tech. report, European Com-
munities, 2007; http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/  
Doc467b.pdf?id=30989. 
8. B. Hulsebosch, G. Lenzini, and H. Eertink, Quality 
Authenticator Scheme D2.3, ICT Policy Support Pro-
gramme, 2009. 
